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Introduction 
The government of Canada announced in the 2006 budget that it was introducing a Public 
Transit Tax credit (PTTC) for individuals purchasing monthly transit passes. The stated 
aim of this budgetary measure was to create an “incentive to use public transit (which) will 
help ease traffic congestion and improve the environment”(Canada Budget 2006). It was 
officially put in place the 1st of July 2006 and seems quite popular among taxpayers since it 
was claimed by almost a million and a half taxpayers two years after its implementation 
(Canada, 2012) 
 Given that it has now been six years since the tax-credit is implemented we find it 
necessary to question its impact. Did it effectively create an incentive to use public 
transport instead of car is the main question of our study. We do not discuss the benefits of 
privileging public transport versus private transport since it seems reasonable to us in a 
perspective of lowering carbon emissions and congestion. Our interest relies on the broader 
question of how to convince people to use public transport? Changing transportation 
behaviour implies obvious comfort cost for users, they lose the independence and the 
comfort the seat a car provides. Is the PTTC sufficient to encourage people to switch? Is the 
fiscal policy a useful tool for transportation position? We do not here pretend to answer all 
those questions but contribute to the debate using two type of studies. First we will 
determine if there was a significative change in public transit ridership due to the 
introduction of this tax credit, which corresponds to analyze the macro-demand for public 
transport. Second we will study the tax credit‟s impact on household expenses for public 
transport that is, we try to assess the impact of the tax credit at a micro-level. It is 
important to note that, due to its recent introduction, we cannot conclude about the long 
term impact of this policy, however we may find some good insights on the importance of it. 
Section one provides the reader with an introduction to the debate of policy tools to 
encourage public transport use. Section two contextualizes the debate in the Canadian 
framework with a presentation of the PTTC. Section three describes the methodology of our 
study and section four gives the results. 
  
Section 1: Literature review 
Encouraging the use of public transit facilities has been a constant preoccupation of 
governments given the rise in urbanisation. Transportation demand management 
strategies all insists on the importance of promoting shared transport option, especially for 
peak time hours. Shared transport can help reduce traffic and thus facilitate commuting 
between city centers and residential areas. Another reason to encourage public transport is 
the environmental benefits it provides to society. We will first review the different forms of 
interventions and organization through the world and in Canada and then get insights of 
the determinants of public transport demand. 
Government intervention and organization of public transport 
A popular justification for government intervention in public transport is that it helps 
reducing the externality provoked by congestion. Solow (Solow, 1973) showed that the 
efficient mount of land to be used for transportation is a decreasing function of the distance 
to the city center: that is in practical term it would be efficient to build 9 lane highway in 
the middle of a city center! However this model does not take into account rigidities that 
could arise in the construction of new roads and railways, it is harder to be a Baron 
Haussmann (who implemented Paris‟ „grands boulevards‟) or a Robert Moses (commonly 
referred as the master builder of New York City) today. If roads are not infinitely 
expandable, growth in use will cause congestion and thus each new driver will impose an 
external cost on others if there is no toll system (Solow, 1973). We could thus see a bus as 
an instrument to lower each driver‟s burden since it will help lower traffic and so lower 
congestion. If we push this argument to the extreme, an efficient bus service could help 
maintaining the status of public good we generally attribute to a road. 
Another justification for government intervention in transport is the reduction in pollution 
it implies. Transport is a major contributor to gas emission; a note released by the 
European Federation of Transport and Environment estimates at almost 30% the 
contribution of transport to co2 emissions ("CO2 emissions from transport in the EU27 ", 
2010). Although transit systems emit polluting gases, the individual contribution to the 
emissions per capita is significantly lower. Indeed, in a study of emissions in 84 cities, 
Kenworthy found that the share of public transport in total CO2 emissions per capita was 
under 50% for 80 cities and under 20% for 66 cities of its sample (Kenworthy, 2003). The 
international association of public transport records that the highest per-capita emissions 
are found in the cities were public transport is the least popular (UITP, 2011). 
Considering the recent rise in oil and thus fuel prices, public transport seems more and 
more a viable solution to lower individuals‟ dependency on cars. But investments in order to 
make it  a reliable option to cars are high. Mass transit systems should be fast and offers 
numerous destinations within the city. Traditionally economists concluded that it implies 
very high fixed cost and increasing return to scale ending up in natural monopolies, 
justifying government interventions for those systems. However recent research and 
successful private public partnerships (PPP) put in doubt this belief (Berechman, 1993). 
Tokyo is the best example of PPP where there are three public operators and eight private. 
Routes are unique but as operators‟ station are near each other, they indeed compete to 
move people from point A to point B. Buses and trolleys are found to be less demanding in 
fixed investments and there exist numerous cities in the world where they are operated by 
private companies, the best known case is England where services have been deregulated in 
1986 (Romilly, 2001) and it is common to see public buses run by cooperatives of bus drivers 
(known as „Gremios‟) in South American countries. In Canadian metropolis, transit is 
provided by municipal operators when the borders of the city correspond to the area where 
population is living. In metropolis where administrative borders are not representative of 
population dispersion, it is often the case that there exist two separate municipal transit 
agencies which serve their respective cities and some connection points. The exception is 
the region of Vancouver where transit is provided by a provincial authority. We should also 
note that there exist Canadian municipalities where service is provided by private 
operators (Thompson MB, Corner Brook NL for instance).  
Even if transit is mainly a local preoccupation it is not unusual to see the intervention of 
central governments in those matters which takes different forms worldwide. Transit 
system can be owned by central governments as it is the case in New York, Paris or 
Vancouver. However the main form of intervention from central government is by funding 
transit system in form of subsidies and investments. In Canada, provincial and municipal 
contribution to transit systems (through subsidies or emitting special debt for public transit 
operators) amounts to 37% of total operating costs, whereas passenger revenues represent 
46,5%, (CUTA, 2011a). Federal and provincial governments are also main contributors to 
the capital expenditures of transit systems in Canada, federal and provincial contribution 
both accounts for a little bit more than 70% of capital expenditures. There are great 
differences in provinces ranging from 92% central government funding in Saskatchewan to 
0% funding in Newfoundland and Labrador (CUTA, 2011a). 
Finally, a less direct way of supporting public transport is by lowering the cost of travelling 
through tax relief for transit system user. This is the option chosen by the Canadian federal 
government throughout the tax credit for transit passes. The Canadian scheme is unique in 
the sense that only individuals can claim the tax credit. Similar tax relief policies in the 
USA, Holland or Ireland are such that both the employers and the employees receive a 
financial incentive in form of tax deduction under the condition that the employer provides 
the transit pass to the employee (Potter et al, 2006). In the US (IRS, 2011) and in Ireland 
(Citizens Information, 2009) employees receive a tax free voucher for public transportation 
and employers can claim this voucher as a salary which increases payroll and so lower total 
taxes. In the USA employers can even declare as a transportation fringe benefit the fact 
that employees use their bicycle to commute and car-sharing if organized through the 
employers (IRS, 2011). Indeed before the implementation of the tax credit for transit passes 
CUTA was supporting such a scheme similar to the American one for Canada (CUTA, 
2005). Those policies are in line with the recommendation of the transit cooperative 
research program (TRCP report 87) which insists on the necessity to integrate the 
employers in the effort of transport demand management Those tax relief actions are often 
more specifically aimed at commuters choosing to use transit system to go and leave work 
rather than just users of the transit system. 
What influences the demand for public transport? 
Taylor and Fink (Taylor & Fink, 2003) distinguished two kinds of analysis in transit 
literature. The first using survey data aims at describing transit for particular system. This 
literature insists on the importance of preferences and constraints with respect to travel 
options (fare, perception of service quality and quantity...) and neglects external factors 
which lead to the formation of those preferences. The second approach does exactly the 
contrary by insisting on those external factors (socio-economic factors, government policies, 
geographic factors). Some effort has been made to reconcile both approach but we can also 
note that the data available will also greatly influence the choices made by authors. 
The first interest for public regulator is the incidence of fare on ridership as they are 
generally regulated by government agencies. Theoretically an increase in fare has two 
effects: a revenue effect and a substitution effect. The substitution effect to be considered 
here is that increasing the absolute cost of public transit will also lower the relative cost of 
using private car and thus it could lead to an increase in car use. If the direction of the 
change in ridership is known precaution should be the rule in assessing how big this change 
is. Most studies conclude that there is low fare elasticity even if they are quite variable if 
we consider different factors (city versus rural transport, peak and off peak demand, and 
purpose of the trip...) (Balcombe et al., 2004). This calls for a better understanding of non-
price factors. 
As we saw before, price does not seem to be the major determinant of the use of public 
transport. In fact the level of transit is much more affected by the choices that have been 
made on an urban level and by the demographic composition of population. Urban design  
has long been used as an explicative factor; the problem is that there is not a clear measure 
of it, especially in macro-measures. People move mainly from their residences to work and 
commercial zones; if those three zones are well differentiated it is straightforward to 
picture that the distance between those three zones is relevant for the analysis. However, 
in cities where the three zones are mixed up, it is not the distance but also the density 
which becomes relevant (Balcombe et al., 2004).  
Last factor to take account for are economic factors and policies. As most trips are due to 
everyday commuting it makes sense that the economic situation be present in explicative 
variables. In fact there is a widely accepted view that transit is more dependent on the 
economic cycle than the use of private cars. Among economic factors unemployment seems 
to be a more reliable indicator that  GDP per-capita (Taylor & Fink, 2003). Generally both 
indicators are included and analyzed separately. Finally, as most studies aims to determine 
if certain policies are efficient or not they are often added as binary variables in papers. 
One classic paper about the role of subsidies is Romily‟s one (Romilly, 2001). He estimated 
time series equation, using panel data from England, and then calculated the impact of 
subsidies taking into account bus deregulation (as a dichotomic variable). Deregulation is 
found to provide welfare gains as soon as subsidies are reduced so that competition can 
effectively work . Thus, subsidies present to alter the possible welfare loss induced by 
potential monopolistic markets become a dead-end in deregulated market. 
  
Section two: contextualization 
Economic situation in Canada 
Fig 1: GDP and unemployment rate in Canada, 1997 to 2009 
 
Source: CANSIM table380-0102 - Gross domestic product indexes, annual (2007=100) 
 CANSIM table 109-5304-Unemployment rate 
The first aspect we would like to study is the economic performance of Canada from 1997 to 
2009 which is the range of the ridership study. In general we find that this period has been 
characterized by strong growth, except in the last year, 2009. As we can appreciate in Fig 1, 
the unemployment rate reached a low of 6% in 2007 and the real GDP grew constantly. The 
2008 financial crisis, affected the Canadian economy in 2009 during which Canada entered 
into a recession, the unemployment rate hiked up to 8.5%, and the GDP decreased by 2%. 
We find that the recession was felt differently from provinces to province. We can see in the 
table 1 that the unemployment rate was higher in 2009 than in 2005 in all Canadian 
provinces except New Brunswick and Saskatchewan. The compound annual growth of the 
real GDP is quite stable around 1% per year in all provinces but Manitoba, which oversaw 
an impressive rate of 2.5% per year, and Ontario for which GDP growth from 2005 to 2009 
is almost zero. Indeed, Ontario seems to be the most affected province and we attribute this 
to the high number of industrial foreclosure that followed the 2008 financial crisis in the 
USA. In addition to small growth we can see that the rise in unemployment during the 
same period is among the highest in Canada. 
Table 1: Unemployment and GDP growth in Canada from 2005 to 2009 
  
Unemployment 
Rate 2005 
Unemployment 
Rate 2009 
Real GDP 
growth 
Real GDP compound 
annual growth rate 
Newfoundland and Labrador 15.2 15.4 1.9% 0.5% 
Nova Scotia  8.4 9.2 4.8% 1.2% 
  
Unemployment 
Rate 2005 
Unemployment 
Rate 2009 
Real GDP 
growth 
Real GDP compound 
annual growth rate 
New Brunswick 9.7 8.9 4.1% 1.0% 
Quebec 8.3 8.5 4.3% 1.1% 
Ontario  6.6 9 0.2% 0.0% 
Manitoba 4.8 5.2 10.4% 2.5% 
Saskatchewan 5.1 4.8 2.4% 0.6% 
Alberta 3.9 6.6 4.6% 1.1% 
British Columbia 5.9 7.6 4.9% 1.2% 
Source: GDP growth rate were calculated with data from table 380-0102 of Cansim. Unemployment rates are 
extracted from the table 109-5304 of Cansim. 
Data from table 2 indicates us that between 2005 and 2009 household income, not adjusted 
for inflation has increased in all provinces. Increase in income for households located in 
urban areas is the slightest. Indeed, when we adjust income for inflation, using provincial 
Consumer prices indexes we see that the real income decreased between 2005 and 2009 for 
urban households. The prairies provinces, low urbanized province, were certainly the one 
which suffers the least during the recession. Indicators of household income (not adjusted 
for inflation) show us that there are the two provinces where it increased the most (+22.5% 
for Saskatchewan, +30.8% for Manitoba). These two provinces are also the one which saw 
the strongest growth in expenditures (not adjusted for inflation). Another interesting point 
is that in general, expenditure growth was twice higher in rural and peri-urban areas than 
in urban Canada. 
Table 2: evolution of income and expenditures in Canada from 2005 to 2009 
  Income (non-corrected for inflation) Real Income Expenditures 
100,000 and over 9.3% 2.3% 5.8% 
Under 100,000 17.3% 11.9% 12.7% 
Rural 20.8% 13.4% 11.4% 
  
  
 
Newfoundland and Labrador 16.1% 9.0% 10.7% 
Nova Scotia 9.8% 2.7% 4.0% 
New Brunswick 15.8% 9.5% 12.9% 
Quebec 4.2% -1.8% 4.6% 
  Income (non-corrected for inflation) Real Income Expenditures 
Ontario 7.0% 0.6% 2.0% 
Manitoba 22.5% 14.4% 16.0% 
Saskatchewan 30.8% 19.4% 24.7% 
Alberta 12.5% 0.1% 9.4% 
British Columbia 5.6% -0.1% 1.0% 
Source: Average means of household income and expenditures from Statistics Canada‟s survey of household 
expenditures of 2005 and 2009. Real income was calculated considering the provincial inflation rate derived 
from Cansim table 326-0021 
The previous findings are a good indication of how the crisis was lived throughout Canada. 
In rural areas, the surge in commodities prices due to its strong demand worldwide created 
a relative economic boom compared to urban Canada which depends more of the US 
economic conditions (or less on worldwide demand for commodities). This is an important 
point for our analysis, since public transport in mainly used in urban areas we have to take 
a particular caution in analyzing its demand using timely data due to the consequences of 
worsening economic conditions. We also saw in the previous section that unemployment 
affects negatively ridership which we interpreted mostly to the drop in daily commuter 
trips. Then if we do not account for economic conditions, changes in time trend can simply 
reflect the effect of the economic crisis rather than a policy effect change. 
Table3: Yearly PTTC claims and tax expenditures resulting from it 
  
Number of PTTC 
claims 
Tax expenditure 
(millons) 
2006 916525 45 
2007 1276776 110 
2008 1473046 135 
2009 1502507*** 140*** 
2010 - 145*** 
2011 - 150*** 
Source: Tax expenditures and evaluation (Canada 2012). *** indicates that the number is an estimation or a 
 prevision 
Table4: PTTC claims per provinces in 2008 
  
Number of 
PTTC 
claimants 
Share of 
Total 
Average 
amount of 
claim 
  
Number of 
PTTC 
claimants 
Share of 
Total 
Average 
amount of 
claim 
Newfoundland and Labrador 3286 0.2 267 
Prince Edward Island 221 0.0 339 
Nova Scotia 18773 1.3 483 
New Brunswick 3902 0.3 379 
Quebec 443394 30.1 674 
Ontario 557378 37.8 903 
Manitoba 37638 2.6 454 
Saskatchewan 17014 1.2 244 
Alberta 176016 11.9 461 
British Columbia 213613 14.5 603 
Northwest Territories 348 0.0 297 
Yukon 184 0.0 223 
Nunavut 38 0.0 234 
 Source: Tax expenditures and evaluation (Canada 2012) 
The PTTC is a non-refundable tax credit which amounts to 15% of yearly expenditures for 
transit passes. The claim a taxfiller does can also include spending of the other member of 
the family. Due to the fact that it is non-refundable, we can note that the poorest families, 
(those with income lower than the personal tax exemption) who are more prone to use 
public transit systems are not eligible. It certainly concerns few families but it is worth to 
mention that the incentive disappears for those. 
The number of claimant for the credit tax however increased substantially from 916 525 in 
the year of its introduction to 1473046 in 2008 but preliminary report, indicate that the 
growth in the number of claimant was low for 2009 (Canada, 2012). The tax expenditure 
resulting from the PTTC is now approximated to be 150 million dollars per year (claimants 
receive 15% of the amount claimed) which does not even represent 1% of total tax 
expenditures (Canada 2012). The highest number of claimants is found in the most 
populated provinces, namely Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta. Interestingly, 
the average amount claimed is higher for Ontario, Quebec and British-Columbia, this may 
due to the fact that urban sprawling obliges a lot of people to combine transit passes from 
different operators which increases their total commuting cost. 
Fig 2: Evolution of Ridership since 1997 in Canadian provinces  
 Let us now have a panorama of the state of public transport in Canada from 1997 to 2009. 
We find in graph 2 that its evolution is pretty different from provinces to provinces. 
Alberta, British Columbia and Nova Scotia oversaw a high growth in ridership whether it 
was steady or almost null for other provinces. The inclusion of the PTTC, which is marked 
by the red line on Fig 2, does not seem to be associated with a difference in the pattern of 
evolution for any of the provinces. 
Table 5: Evolution of transport prices in Canadian provinces from 2005 to 2009 
 
Increase in the Consumer price index from 
2005 to 2009 
Evolution of the 
average fare of 
monthly transit pass 
General; inflation 
from 2005 to 2009 
 Transport Public Transport 
Newfoundland and Labrador -2.88% 13.56% 15.70% 6.51% 
Nova Scotia -1.27% 6.94% 33.33% 6.93% 
New Brunswick -4.96% 16.06% -12.56% 5.68% 
Quebec -0.44% 14.00% 14.25% 6.08% 
Ontario 1.61% 13.23% 12.37% 6.36% 
Manitoba 0.90% 11.08% 5.89% 7.04% 
Saskatchewan -3.43% 13.86% 7.42% 9.54% 
Alberta 1.49% 22.30% 4.23% 12.40% 
British Columbia 2.81% 10.72% 6.52% 5.64% 
Source: The inflation rates are derived from Cansim table 326-0021. Average fares of monthly transit pass are 
provided by the Canadian Urban Transport Association (CUTA). 
Transport inflation from 2005 to 2009 was lower than general inflation in all provinces 
mostly due to the effect of gas prices (table 7). Interestingly, the average fare for monthly 
transit pass (expenses which can be claimed for the tax credit) have had  much more 
variable paths across provinces from 2005 to 2009, from -12.6% in New Brunswick to 
+33.3% in Nova Scotia. The average increase is also lower for prairies and western Canada 
compared to Eastern Canada (except New Brunswick). 
Table 6: Gross and relative expenditures for public Transport in Canada,2005-2009 
 
Average Household 
expenditures for public 
transport in 2009 
Evolution since 
2005 
Ratio of public transport 
expenditures on the 
total of transportation 
expenditures of 
households 
Evolution since 
2005 
100,000 and over 1065.06 13.2% 24.53% 1.5% 
Under 100,000 967.4803 30.5% 19.11% -2.5% 
Rural 362.4636 7.7% 8.58% -5.8% 
     Newfoundland and Labrador 630.9509 1.0% 18.66% -0.6% 
Nova Scotia 608.5608 8.9% 18.57% 1.8% 
New Brunswick 436.1176 19.2% 10.99% -11.3% 
Quebec 635.3035 26.0% 22.18% 5.7% 
Ontario 995.4509 0.0% 22.00% -2.7% 
Manitoba 816.3663 22.3% 19.81% -4.6% 
Saskatchewan 692.1045 40.4% 13.94% -4.7% 
Alberta 1101.499 20.1% 20.48% -1.4% 
British Columbia 1154.105 11.8% 25.23% 12.1% 
Source: Average means of household income and expenditures from Statistics Canada‟s survey of household 
expenditures of 2005 and 2009. 
Tabe 6 gives us an overview of the evolution of expenditures for public transport in Canada, 
we can see that variations are wide. Alberta and Saskatchewan are the provinces spending 
the most in transport but Saskatchewan‟s inhabitants are also among the least prone to use 
public transport as we can see that the ratio of public transport expenditures on transport 
expenditures is the second lowest in Canada. Ontario has a very slow increase which can be 
linked to the previous findings that the recession was stronger in this province which 
certainly lowered the demand for transportation. On the contrary, more favourable 
economic conditions for Manitoba and Saskatchewan are associated with huge increases in 
public transport expenditures. It is to be noted that for those two provinces a low inflation 
rate for transport in general implied a decrease in the ratio of public transport 
expenditures. In Québec and British Colombia, the increase for public transport 
expenditures is bigger relatively to transport expenditures‟ increase whether in the 
Maritimes both increases tend to be similar which does not affect the overall ratio. Peri-
urban zones are the one were expenditures for public transport raised the most but they 
decreased relatively to total transport expenditures, again this may be due to a higher 
inflation of public transport relatively to car-transport. 
Variables 
The policy change implemented in 2006 will be represented by a binary variable. 
Preliminary findings indicate that it is hard to conclude about the evolution of the economic 
situation in whole Canada from 2005 to 2009 due to the structural differences of each 
province economy. Rural areas and prairies provinces seem to have gone softly throughout 
recessions, especially when compared to urban areas. The transport choices, reflected by 
relative expenditures of each mode, are very different from provinces to provinces and, as 
for the economic conditions; we cannot define a general pattern for all Canada. Since we 
don‟t want a yearly identification variable (which would reflect the policy change we want 
to study) to be taken as a proxy for the economic crisis we should ensure that our sample 
will be composed entirely by urban and fully employed workers. Provincial aspects of public 
transport choices lead us to conduct robustness checks to determine if a general conclusion 
obtained from an aggregated Canadian sample can be extrapolated for each province. 
We include various controls to make sure we determine correctly the effect of the tax credit. 
First, we include variables aimed at capturing the economic conditions prevailing in the 
province or for the households. We saw previously that the 2008 global recession affected 
Canada but had different consequences from provinces to provinces. Mainly we use the 
revenue effect and the situation in the labour market to capture those differences. Secondly 
we control for two price effect, direct price effect by including the price consumer face for 
public transport and substitution effect by controlling for potential substitution with cars. A 
third variable commonly used in studies concerns the access to public transport, in the 
ridership estimation we derive it through a measure of service quality for provinces 
whether in the expenses estimation we use spatial location of households. 
Demographic composition can also play a role in explaining urban transport demand. 
Studies of fares impact found that elasticity vary for different type of travelers (Balcombe et 
al, 2004). We can think that the presence or not of elders and students implies a more or 
less extended service as they are populations more prone to use public transit due to the 
reduced access to cars and mobility problems. We think that including those variables in 
our estimation then becomes necessary. 
 
Table 7: Control variables and expected sign 
 
Varaible's description 
Proxy used in ridership 
analysis 
Proxy used in expenses analysis Expected sign of β 
Income effect Logarithm of the GDP per 
capita 
Total income declared by the 
household deflated using provincial 
CPI 
Positive 
Situation in the labor 
market 
Unemployment rate Not taken into account since we use 
a sample of regular workers 
Negative 
Substitution effect 
with car  
Consumer price index for gas Number of vehicle Owned or leased Negative 
Price effect Consumer price for public 
transport 
We do not use directly a price 
variable but indeed deflate 
expenses. 
Negative 
Demographic control Number of inhabitants of 
each province 
Household composition, couple, 
children… 
Positive since more population implies 
more transit 
Number of students Student population of each 
province 
Number of youth age 18 to 24 Negative since students have a reduced 
access to cars 
Number of elders Population aged 65 and more Number of seniors Uncertain since elders live in more areas 
closer to services but also better 
deserved by public transport but they 
may prefer the comfort of a car 
Number of young Not taken into account Number of children aged 0 to 4 and 
number of children aged 5 to17 
Negative since families prefer using a 
car when moving with kids 
Access to transport Ratio of operation's hours of 
commercial vehicle to the 
number of commercial 
vehicles 
Type of Dwelling the household lives 
in 
Positive 
Budget for 
transportation 
Not taken into acount Total expenses of a household for  
transport deflated using the 
Consumer price index for public 
transport 
Uncertain 
Section three: Empirical models 
The analysis of the PTTC impact consists in assessing the sign and significance   in 
the following equation: 
                    
Where   will be the annual number of rides or the expenses for public transport. 
          is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the year corresponds to a one for 
which the PTTC was in application. We will now review the estimation techniques in 
the two studies. 
 Ridership 
We need to test for potential bias due to the stationarity of the time series we are 
analyzing. There are two cases arising in non stationarity of time series: trend and 
unit-root processes. If the presence of a yearly trend is quite easy to verify and 
correct for (OLS estimators associated to the year measure are super-convergent), 
unit root tests are much more complicated, especially in the context of panel data. 
We decided to test using two common statistics proposed respectively by Levin-Lin 
Chu (LLC thereafter) (Levin et al, 2002) and Im Pesaran Shin (IPS thereafter) (Im 
et al, 2003). The results can be found in table 2 of the annex. 
We can see that results are very different for the variable of interest (number of 
rides) if we include or not a time trend. However we remark that the inclusion of a 
time trend lowers considerably the p-value associated with the statistic calculated. 
We can thus reasonably consider that the process does not have a unit root. Indeed 
this reasoning can be applied for the prices and GDP per capita series, even if as a 
precaution we should note that the p-values estimated by the IPS tests are quite 
high (33,34% and 38,69%) so we will consider two estimations one taking into 
account the possibility of unit-root and the other not. Considering the demographic 
variables we clearly see that they have a unit root as the p-value is often nearby one. 
In order to correct for the presence of unit root we decided to include the variable in 
first differences, which is a common way to deal with the problem. We thus have to 
estimates the different equations 
                                                             
  (             )                                     
              (          )                      (       )            
  (             )                                     
Where   is the coefficient of interest and   is the operator for first differences, 
           is the natural logarithm of the per capita GDP,         corresponds to the 
local transport Consumer Price Index and             is a vector of the population 
level including also students and seniors‟ population level. 
For our two estimations we have to take account of problems affecting the error term 
   . We can classify those problems in two, first the possible heterogeneity effects, 
fixed effect and heteroskedasticity. Secondly we should take special precautions in 
order to avoid the inter-temporal and inter-individuals correlations. We have been 
processing the tests following this structure. The results can be found in table 3 of 
the annex. 
Fixed effect models are used when, for each province in the sample the individual 
unobserved particularity is correlated with the explicative terms. For instance, in 
the regression estimated we could imagine that the unobserved economic structure 
has an incidence on the per-capita GDP and unemployment. Alternatively we could 
consider those individual effects to be uncorrelated with explicative variables; this is 
the random effect model. We proceed to a Hausman test following Greene‟s 
recommendation (Greene & Zhang, 2003), under the null hypothesis the covariance 
between the coefficients is zero and there is no efficiency gain from one estimation 
measure to another. We reject this hypothesis and conclude that we should take 
account of possible correlation between the error term and the explicative variables. 
The test for heteroskedasticity is a traditional Fisher test between the residuals and 
the explicative variables. We also reject the null hypothesis (no heteroskedasticity) 
so some correction need to be applied in the variance estimation of coefficients. 
The previous tests were done in order to estimate possible miscalculation in the 
variance estimation due to the intrinsic characteristics of the individuals, being 
measured or not by the explicative variables. We now try to evaluate if our 
estimation procedure should take account of cross-correlation throughout 
individuals or throughout time. To test for bias sourcing from inter-individual 
correlation, that is, a bias due to the fact that contemporaneous shocks for two 
different provinces are correlated, we use a Breusch Pagan test (Greene & Zhang, 
2003). The test for inter-temporal correlation, correlation arising when shocks 
propagate throughout time is done using a Wald test. For both test we obtain a p-
value of zero which leads us to conclude that inter-temporal and inter-individual 
correlations are present and thus we should control for it in the estimation. 
The results calls for a generalized least square estimation of both models presented 
in section 3. This can be easily done via the software Stata. The error term which we 
model for the estimation is then: 
                   
Where      is a white noise following a normal distribution. Also, since we assume 
inter-individual correlation we have  (         )    and heteroskedasticity means 
that  (         )        where      is the vector of explicative variables. Let‟s note that 
   can be assumed to be different for each province or be the same. There is no clear 
test for our decision and so we will report the results with both assumptions which 
we would denote province specific ar(1) (psar1) regressions if we consider    or ar(1) 
regressions if we consider only one   
 Expenses 
We try to assess the impact of tax credit on household‟s expenditures for public 
transport. Our data comes from the Canadian Survey of Household Spending of 2005 
and 2009, restricting our sample to urban population so as to assess particularly the 
policy change consequences on the targeted population (urban population have a 
much better access to public transport than rural population) 
Since we wish a yearly binary variable to represent uniquely the change of policy 
introduced by the Canadian government we try to eliminate any potential noise, the 
most important being the economic changes. We thus restrict our sample to fully 
employed individuals in 2005 and 2009. Our definition of employed is very strict 
since we only consider households where respondent and spouse both declared full 
time job for 52 weeks but it still allows for a large sample of 4428 observations. 
Finally another precautionary measure is to deflate the expenditures considering 
each particular consumer price index (CPI) category. That is, income is deflated 
using the provincial inflation rate calculated as the percentage change in the general 
CPI while transport expenditure will be deflated using provincial inflation rate of 
transportation CPI. 
The first equation we estimate takes the form: 
                       
Where     is the real expenditude on public transport for household  ,    is a vector 
of the household real income, .    is a vector of household demographic 
characteristics and access to cars.      is binary variable taking the value 1 if the 
household was interogated in 2009 so able to claim a tax credit for his expenses in 
public transit passes and 0 if not. 
A second model we estimate is: 
                                                       
So as to assess if the change in policy affected differently considering provinces and 
dwelling types which are a proxy for location in more dense areas (apartments are 
more prone to be situated in crowded areas where there is better access to public 
transit systems). 
Finally we also estimate a third model: 
    (   )     (  )                      
So that the   coefficients represent the elasticity to income and the transport budget 
elasticity 
The coefficients and variances estimation are calculated in a way that it takes into 
account the relative weight of each household in the original population since some 
type of households may be over-represented in the surveys. The weights we use are 
provided by Statistics Canada and corresponds to the estimated number of actual 
households a sampled household represents (Statistics Canada, 2007 2011). 
  
Section 3: results 
Ridership 
Table 4 in annex shows us the results for the different regression runs. The first 
observation we can make is that the method of estimation changes greatly some 
coefficients and their robustness. This should lead us to some precaution in our 
interpretation. However, we note that the more robust coefficients, the one for which 
the p-value is almost constantly under 5%, are the ones for which their value do not 
change much in the different regression. In this section we will try to answer the 
different questions we developed previously. First we can find in the following tables 
the estimated daily increase in travelers if some variables were to be changed using 
two scenarios: the commuter one (245 days per year) and the everyday travel one 
(365 days per year). Those results have to be taken with precaution because, some of 
the coefficients on which are they are based are statistically non-significative. Reg 1 
is the basic regression, while reg 2 is the regression using first differences for the per 
capita GDP and transport CPI. The data used for the calculations of effects are the 
coefficients estimated which can be found in table 3 of the annex.  
Table 8: Estimated daily increase of travels under scenario 1 (commuters) 
 
Table 9: Estimated daily increase of travels under scenario 2 (everyday travelers) 
  reg1 reg2 reg1ar1 reg2ar1 reg1psar1 reg2psar1 
1% increase 
      GDPcapita -75934.0 -484649.3 72976.9 15532.7 112115.1 41517.3 
Unemployment 6640.4 9537.1 -3446.0 -4931.5 -6126.0 -5915.7 
1 unit increase 
      CPI transport -1410.7 -818.4 -2464.0 -2448.5 -2864.6 -3108.1 
CPI gas 1068.1 1209.8 -392.7 110.0 -240.3 -47.7 
service quality 1843.6 1718.2 1779.5 2111.2 -91.6 2209.4 
Student population 1.3 1.5 0.6 0.5 1.5 1.9 
Elders population 8.6 9.0 31.6 30.7 35.0 36.3 
  reg1 reg2 reg1ar1 reg2ar1 reg1psar1 reg2psar1 
1% increase 
      
  Does the tax credit tax have an impact? 
Table 10: Coefficients associated to the PTTC in the ridership equations 
reg1 reg2 reg1ar1 reg2ar1 reg1psar1 reg2psar1 
-4262164 -6134546 -116974 -5712275 -965963 -3169393 
Legend: *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at 1%, ** indicates that the coefficient is 
significant at 5%, * indicates that the coefficient is significant at 10%. 
We find no impact of the tax credit on the annual ridership in Canada. The 
coefficients are remarkably non-significative in each regression so that it is 
impossible to conclude that ridership on public transit has been influenced by the 
Canadian policy. The rise in the number of demands by taxpayers therefore seems to 
be due more to better awareness about the tax-credit possibility by Canadians who 
are already users of public transport than a change in the behaviour. This can be 
corroborated by the fact that the number of claims increased considerably from 2006 
to 2007  but was just around 2% higher  in 2009 than in 2008 .Let‟s remark that the 
sing of the coefficient is always negative. So the credit tax would have had a 
negative impact on ridership which is quite counter-intuitive. As we measured the 
policy change through a binary variable however we could think that this variable 
would reflect more economic disturbance than only the policy change. We will get 
more detail of this possibility in the next section. 
 Is public transit a substitute for car? 
It seems that gas prices are not a strong explicative factor of public transit use in 
Canada. It is true that in the most basic regression which does not take account of 
any possible disturbances, we observe that the coefficients associated with the CPI 
GDPcapita -50969.4 -325312.6 48984.5 10426.0 75255.3 27867.8 
Unemployment 4457.2 6401.6 -2313.1 -3310.2 -4112.0 -3970.8 
1 unit increase 
      CPI transport -946.9 -549.3 -1653.9 -1643.5 -1922.8 -2086.3 
CPI gas 716.9 812.0 -263.6 73.8 -161.3 -32.0 
service quality 1237.5 1153.3 1194.5 1417.1 -61.5 1483.0 
Student population 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.3 
Elders population 5.7 6.0 21.2 20.6 23.5 24.3 
of gas are significative. They are positive and indicate quite a big impact as an 
increase of the price of gas would add around 1500 travels per day (in the 365 days 
scenario). However it is important to note that in those regressions we observe that 
the CPI of public local transport is non-significative, which is quite un-intuitive. 
Now, when we take account of possible disturbances in the error term we get a 
totally reversed panorama. First, the coefficient on the gas CPI is never robust at 5% 
whereas the coefficient for the public transport CPI (in a differentiated form or not) 
are always greatly significant. Furthermore, the impact of the price of public 
transport is quantitatively almost the same in each regression: around 3000 to 4000 
travels per day are lost due to a public transport price increase. We think that those 
numbers are more representative of the gross impact of price. First, it is hard to 
consider public transport travel as a perfect substitute for car transport on a short 
term as choices in the area of transportation are greatly influenced by actual 
conditions of living (suburban house versus downtown apartment, owing a car or 
not…). Second, we cannot conclude that gas price is the unique factor which 
influences the decision to take the car or not, people can still prefer to have a seat for 
sure in their car rather than standing in a bus even if gas is expensive. Finally the 
scope of the impact is not impressive, if we consider that people work 245 days per 
year and that their use of public transport is mostly for commuting between work 
and home, then and decrease in the price adds around 2 500 commuters per day in 
buses and light rail trains which is a less important number than for unemployment 
for instance. 
 Other factors 
We discussed previously various factors which could influence the use or not of 
public transit, we distinguished economic and non-economic factors. The sign of the 
coefficient associated with those indicators are generally intuitive but we should 
take some caution in interpreting the quantitative number as it would be quite 
unreasonable to suppose that „everything holds constant‟. For instance, we cannot 
suppose that the unemployment increases and the rate of growth of GDP holds 
constant. 
First, economic conditions seems to be an important explicative factor for the use of 
public transport, the unemployment rate has a negative impact while growth of GDP 
has a positive impact. That is to say, growth encourages the use of public transport, 
it also provides more job to the economy which again encourages public transport 
use. However, we can note that if the coefficients attached to the measure of GDP 
growth are quantitatively higher than the one attached to unemployment, they 
range from large to low value. Furthermore, considering the possible unit-root 
problems, we find that it would be more informative to look at the coefficient 
attached to the differentiated vector. There, we find that only one coefficient is 
significant and we even have a negative coefficient on the first basic regression. On 
the other hand, the unemployment rate coefficient, once the regressions are 
corrected for the error term, keeps the same sign and quite a constant value. These 
findings are consistent with the literature (Taylor & Fink, 2003) which insists on the 
commuting aspect of public transport, therefore, less employment means that less 
people need to go from home to a job. In our model, one point of percentage less of 
unemployment could add between 3500 to 6000 commuters a day per province. 
Demographic and urban factors also play a role in explaining public transport. The 
coefficients on service quality measure and senior population are in the majority of 
regression significative and their sign is positive.1 So it seems that the demographic 
composition of population matters, as the investment on the expansion of network. 
We also constantly find a positive impact of student population even if the intensity 
of it is mitigated by the un-stability of its value. 
Results Expenses 
Table 11: Coefficients of  ’s in basic regression 
  
Basic 
Basic 
Regression 
Considering 
only 
apartment 
households 
Basic 
regression 
without 
budget for 
transport 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
considering 
only 
apartment 
household 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
without 
budget for 
transportation 
year2009 -134.68143** -364.76456*** -135.57237** -47.254798 196.29645 -60.051667 
Interaction of Year 2009 with provinces 
NL  
   
-166.39107 -78.818302 -111.4774 
NS 
   
244.0084 -272.5068 244.16519 
NB 
   
-86.343267 200.49667 -56.912489 
QC 
   
80.861151 -201.6463 82.437269 
ON 
   
-181.17035 -744.46565** -222.68355 
MB 
   
-247.5005 -543.96343* -249.83142 
SK 
   
196.20961 -149.344 267.05989 
AL 
   
8.0181044 -164.01283 47.549623 
                                               
1 The only divergence to this observation is on regression 1 with province specific ar(1) errors 
where the coefficient for service quality is negative but there we should remark that it is not 
significative. 
Legend: *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at 1%, ** indicates that the coefficient is 
significant at 5%, * indicates that the coefficient is significant at 10%. 
 
Table 12: Coefficients of  ’s in log regression 
  
Basic 
Basic 
Regression 
Considering 
only 
apartment 
households 
Basic 
regression 
without 
budget for 
transport 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
considering 
only 
apartment 
household 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
without 
budget for 
transportation 
year2009 -0.08511101 -.19842773** -0.10091873 -0.12505505 0.20268725 -0.1561017 
Interaction of Year 2009 with provinces 
NL 
   
-0.16820961 0.93686374 -0.08459458 
NS 
   
0.12749118 -0.42591413 0.15056653 
NB 
   
-0.16303776 0.74434466 -0.08159735 
QC 
   
-0.16803205 -0.0748352 -0.18223856 
ON 
   
-0.12993551 -0.34449033 -0.20805238 
MB 
   
-0.32925349 -0.16401923 -0.3289749 
SK 
   
0.14849649 -0.06969351 0.25913006 
AL 
   
-0.12472777 0.15830274 -0.06980926 
Legend: *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at 1%, ** indicates that the coefficient is 
significant at 5%, * indicates that the coefficient is significant at 10%. 
 What is the effect of the tax credit? 
We do not find an evidence of impact for the tax credit in the demand for public 
transport in Canada. In both expenses and log regressions, the coefficients 
associated to the binary time variable are negative and both coefficient are non-
significant when we consider a level of 99%. However we should note that in the 
expenses regression the coefficient is significative at a 95% confidence level. This 
difference however should be taken cautiously since we have seen previously that a 
binary time variable could also be a proxy for crisis effect. This doubt about the true 
nature of the binary variable is re-inforced by the fact that the coefficient is negative 
which would imply that if we consider the yearly variable to represent only the 
change in policy from the federal government then subsiding consumption of public 
transport leads to a decrease in real expenditures for it. 
If we relax the assumption that our variable only takes into account policy change 
then a negative coefficient could be plausible. When describing the situation of 
public transport within Canada we saw that the price of public transport raised 
more compared to the price of general transport, changing then the relative price of 
public versus car transport. The real expenditures of public transport decreasing 
while we control for real income (therefore controlling for revenue effect) could be 
the reflection of the negative substitution effect. If this would be true then the tax 
credit simply does not provide sufficient incentives for consumer to increase their 
demand for public transport. 
However, in other regressions (log-regressions or regressions considering interaction 
between variables we see that the yearly variable is  insignificant (the p-value is 
higher than 20%) which comfort our suspicion that the tax credit does not offer a 
sufficient incentive for people to use more public transport than their personal car. 
To check the robustness of our conclusion and assess if there is not an indirect 
impact due to changes in behaviour of consumers we ran a structural Chow test. We 
ran regressions in sub-sample of 2005 and 2009 under the null hypothesis that the 
change in policy did not have any structural effect we have                . We 
compute the Chow statistics which is to be compared with the critical value of the 
Fisher distribution with degrees of freedom (4428, 33). The statistic of 1.51 is higher 
than the 5% critical value but lower than the 2.5% critical value. Again this is not a 
sufficiently strong evidence to conclude indoubtly that the differences between 2005 
and 2009 (which include the policy change) have an impact in transport 
expenditures. 
In addition we ran a model (basic and log-model) which excluded the budget for 
transport and a model limited to the households who are living in apartments.  As 
previously, we find a negative sign for the coefficient associated to the yearly 
variable. This coefficient is 5% significative in the non-interacted expenditure 
regressions such as in the log regression considering only households living in 
apartments. In the regression where we interact the yearly variable with provinces 
we find a significative negative sign of the interacted term only for Ontario and 
Manitoba. Again we think that this result is due to the fact that our variable does 
not capture only the policy change but also some economic disturbance effects. If we 
accept this theory it gives sense that the significant effect is observed for the Ontario 
and Manitoba since they were the most variable provinces.  
We can conclude arguing that the credit tax per-se did not have a real impact in 
public transport demand for Canadian individuals. In the regressions we ran where 
the impact of the tax was significant we actually found a negative impact which we 
interpret as the identification of a potential substitution effect since relative prices 
of public transport to general transportation actually increased. It is however to be 
noted that those cases were found on very few estimations and that none the t-stat 
for the coefficients nor the Chow statistic were higher than the 2,5% critical value. 
 Other variables taken into consideration 
Let us now concentrates on the other determinants for public transport expenditure. 
We will first study the monetary aspect (income and general transport budget) then 
study the other determinants. 
Table 12: Coefficients for selected determinants of transport expenditure 
  Basic 
Basic 
Regression 
Considering 
only 
apartment 
households 
Basic 
regression 
without 
budget for 
transport 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
considering 
only 
apartment 
household 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
without 
budget for 
transportation 
Real Income 
 
.00979106*** 
.02125195*** .01147101*** .00959388*** .02064194*** 
.01124768***   
Square of the real 
income 
-7.79E-09 
-4.385e-
08*** 
-9.78E-09 -7.28E-09 
-4.262e-
08*** -9.23E-09 
Budget for 
transport 
.0233599*** .03409897*** 
 
.02353108*** 
.03556212*** 
 
Vehicle Owned 
-
537.61372*** 
-
1007.0661*** 
-426.4491*** 
-
539.32821*** 
-
1022.3096*** -426.40355*** 
Vehicle Leased 
-
716.72374*** 
-
1217.8009*** 
-544.6973*** 
-
712.85387*** 
-
1164.5966*** -542.97022***  
Semi Detached 
house 
394.02926** 
 
410.2506** 447.19652** 
 
405.00149* 
Terraced house 354.88833** 
 
379.30566** 447.74702** 
 
465.96173** 
Duplex 113.98856 
 
109.55932 178.34898 
 
149.40288 
Apartment 424.04762*** 
 
456.06892*** 556.16061*** 
 
562.48834*** 
Hotel/Mobile home 493.08971* 
 
501.98523* 431.63213* 
 
428.01912*   
Legend: *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at 1%, ** indicates that the coefficient is 
significant at 5%, * indicates that the coefficient is significant at 10%. 
 
Table 13: Coefficients for selected determinants of transport expenditure in log regressions 
  Basic 
Basic 
Regression 
Considering 
only 
apartment 
households 
Basic 
regression 
without 
budget for 
transport 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
considering 
only 
apartment 
household 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
without 
budget for 
transportation 
Real Income .29235826** .62462799** .64176914*** .28165259** .96835691** .62276805*** 
Square of the real 
income 
1.82E-07 -2.52E-07 6.09E-08 1.87E-07 -3.75E-07 
6.77E-08 
Budget for .39960641*** .61868034*** 
 
.40047566*** 
 
 
  Basic 
Basic 
Regression 
Considering 
only 
apartment 
households 
Basic 
regression 
without 
budget for 
transport 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
considering 
only 
apartment 
household 
Interaction 
with 
provinces 
without 
budget for 
transportation 
transport 
Vehicle Owned 
-
.66731657*** 
-1.572676*** -.4445282*** 
-
.66800758*** 
-
.99861536*** -.44286414*** 
Vehicle Leased -.9204531*** 
-
1.7770178*** 
-
.51856505*** 
-.9211077*** 
-
.93326166*** -.51988929*** 
Semi Detached 
house 
0.24521348 
 
0.25637735 .41254977* 
 0.35111248 
Terraced house .23057235* 
 
.29065017** 0.28250001 
 .30770803* 
Duplex 0.11098986 
 
0.16126578 0.1108673 
 0.11318008 
Apartment .40064772*** 
 
.44724496*** .39261107** 
 .41377793** 
Hotel/Mobile home .58390404* 
 
.57359741* .7843349** 
 .75347221**  
Legend: *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at 1%, ** indicates that the coefficient is 
significant at 5%, * indicates that the coefficient is significant at 10%. 
Both real income and real total expenditures for transport have a significant and 
positive impact on public transport expenditures. We do not observe a significant 
impact for squared income neither do we find that the elasticity of public transport 
expenditures is function of real income. It indicates us that the relation is quite 
linear for household. Being wealthier increases the demand for mobility which then 
implies more expenditure for public transport. We should however note that the 
marginal effects are quite small (mot higher than 1.5 cents in general and provincial 
regressions) and,  the elasticity to income being lower than one, then public 
transport is then a necessary good rather than a luxury good (Deaton 1997, chapter 
4). This is confirmed when we look at the impact of raising the budget for 
transportation, one more dollar for transportation just increases by 2 cents the 
expenditures in public transport. 
It them seems that preferences in transportation are still mostly car oriented and 
that public transportation is seen as a “cheap” way of traveling rather than a 
reliable alternative in transportation modes. Indeed, we can observe that, 
controlling for transport expenditures, owing a car imply an average $537 decrease 
in public transport expenditures while leasing is associated with a $715 decrease. In 
average, owing a car decreases by around 60% the expenditures in public transport 
and leasing induces a reduction of 70%. Theses drops would imply that the share of 
public transportation in transport expenditures is reduced to almost nothing, 
confirming the predominance of car-preference in Canadian mobility scheme. 
The type of dwelling is mostly a measure of spatial location of household so the 
coefficients on dwellings more associated with higher urban densities (and probably 
more access to public transport since they are very much centrally oriented) are also 
the more prone to spend for public transport. Those findings are to be linked with 
our results in section 3 where we found that the quality of service, measure as the 
number of vehicle per kilometer of network, was a strong explicative factor of 
ridership. In annex we can find the coefficients for demographic coefficients which 
are expected given results in section three. Young children in the family, requiring 
more mobility from parents (outdoor activities, in and out school transportation...) 
imply a lesser share for public transport. On the other hand the presence of 
teenagers, young adults and seniors, population which are not able to drive due to 
economic or mobility constraints but sufficiently old to move by themselves, increase 
household share of public transport. 
  
Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to determine if the Canadian tax credit on monthly passes 
has been a useful explicative factor of ridership evolution and household 
expenditures for public transport from 2005 to 2009. We found that Canada is no 
different than other countries and that the main determinants of demands are: 
economic conditions, specially the unemployment rate; urban design such as the 
type of dwelling or the quality of service and the access to a car. Demographic 
variable plays a significant role which we attribute as the consequence of the limited 
mobility of certain populations.  
The PTTC, did not seem to have a significative impact on both the ridership and 
demand equation. We think that this can be because federal government policy 
toward public transport is incomplete without encouraging companies to incent their 
employees to use shared transport option for commuting. For now the tax credit is 
more a tax present to transit users rather than a policy which changes the behaviour 
of commuters. Perhaps the federal government would get a better cost-benefit 
intervention if it dedicated more finance to infrastructure projects rather than try to 
incentive people through fiscal policy. One important thing our study did was to 
picture the big differences in public transport policy in each province and we believe 
that those differences call for a more specific rather than a unilateral approach for 
each province from the Canadian federal government. 
We found that car is not a perfect substitute since price of private transportation 
play a little role in ridership explanation. However, at a micro-economic level we 
found that having access to a car significantly lower the expenses dedicated to public 
transportation. We believe that this reflects the fact that public transportation is 
still viewed as a non-desirable good and that Canadian still prefer car in lieu of 
shared transportation. Therefore it is understandable that private transportation 
cost would not affect demand for public transport since consumer behaves such that 
public transportation is not a sufficiently good substitute of private transportation. 
Furthermore, if the objective of the Canadian tax exemption was to reduce car 
usage, we should note that public transit is still heavily centralized (downtown-
suburbs) whereas more and more commuting is done in suburbs.. For instance, in 
Montreal, the metropolitan community observes a tendency for suburban population 
to commute inside their suburban region rather than to central Montreal (CMM, 
2012).This is certainly a factor that has to be taken account in federal actions 
encouraging the use of public transport.  One extension to this study could be to 
analyze the patterns of traffics before and after the implementation of the federal 
tax credit for transit passes. 
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Table 1 : Data used 
Variable's name Varaible's description Source 
Used in 
Ridership 
analysis 
Used in 
expenses 
analysis 
lnpib_capita Logarithm of the GDP of each 
province divided by number of 
inhabitants 
CANSIM 384-0001 for 
provincial GDP GDP 
Yes No 
ipc_essence Consumer price index for gas CANSIM 326-0021 Yes No 
ipc_transportlocal public transport CANSIM 326-0021 Yes Yes (to 
deflate 
public 
transport 
expenses) 
population Number of inhabitants of each 
province 
CANSIM 051-0001 Yes No 
Popetudiante Student population of each 
province 
CANSIM 477-0013 yes No 
Vieux Population aged 65 and more  CANSIM 051-0001 Yes No 
Service Quality Ratio of operation's hours of 
comercial vehicle to the number 
of comercial vehicles 
CUTA-ACTU Yes No 
realk031bis   Total expenses of a household for 
public tranpsport deflated using 
the Consumer price index for 
public transport 
Expenses are declared in the 
Survey of household 
expenditures and the CPI come 
from CANSIM 326-0021 
No Yes 
realincome  Total income declared by the 
household deflated using 
provincial CPI 
Income is declared in the 
Survey of household 
expenditures and the CPI come 
from CANSIM 326-0021 
No Yes 
realk001  Total expenses of a household for  
tranpsport deflated using the 
Consumer price index for public 
transport 
Expenses are declared in the 
Survey of household 
expenditures and the CPI come 
from CANSIM 326-0021 
No Yes 
year2009  Binary indicating if the household has been interviewed in 2009 No Yes 
nmvehonp  Number of vehicle Owned Survey of households 
Expenditures 
No Yes 
vehleasp  Number of vehicle Leased Declared by household in the 
Survey of households 
Expenditures 
No Yes 
typdwelp  Type of Dwelling the household 
lives in. 1 are single detached 
dwellings, 2 are semi-detached. 3 
are Row dwellings. 4 are duplex. 
5 are apartments. 6 are hotels or 
mobile home.  
Survey of Household 
expenditures 
No Yes 
hhtypep Household Type. 1 is a household Survey of Household No Yes 
Variable's name Varaible's description Source 
Used in 
Ridership 
analysis 
Used in 
expenses 
analysis 
with one person. 2 is a couple. 3 
is a couple with single children. 4 
is a couple with relatives. 5 are 
lone parents. 6 and 7 are other 
type of households. 
expenditures 
i.child0to4  Number of children aged 0 to 4 Survey of Household 
expenditures 
No Yes 
i.child5to17  Number of children aged 5 to 17 Survey of Household 
expenditures 
No Yes 
i.seniors65  Number of seniors Survey of Household 
expenditures 
No Yes 
i.youth18to24  Number of youth age 18 to 24 Survey of Household 
expenditures 
No Yes 
 
Table 2 : results of Unit root tests 
 
Unit root tests 
P-value for H0: panels have a unit root 
 
llc ips test controls 
tvel qtity 0 0.0773 const, trend 
tvel qtity 0.881 0.9997 const 
lnpib capita 0.0497 0.8226 const, trend 
lnpib capita 0 0.4165 const 
taux chomage 0.0071 0 const 
ipc_tsport local 0.0039 0.3869 const, trend 
ipc essence 0.024 0.0067 const, trend 
population 0.9577 1 const, trend 
popetudiante 0.5278 0.9847 const, trend 
vieux 1 1 const, trend 
 
 
Table 3: results of errors misspecification tests (p-values in italic) 
 
 
Regressions 
  No First Differences First differences 
Fixed Effect 49.28 63.92 
Hausman Test 0.00 0.00 
Heteroskedasticity 34.2 29.71 
Fisher Test 0.00 0.00 
Intra-individual 114.882 106.493 
 
Regressions 
  No First Differences First differences 
Correlation 
Breusch Pagan Test 0.00 0.00 
Intertemporal correlation 340000 78694.22 
Wald Test 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 4 : Results of the regressions ran for the ridership analysis 
  
                                                                           legend: * p<.15; ** p<.1; *** p<.05
                                                                                                              
       _cons   -6.256e+09       2.607e+09               0       5.679e+09***            0       8.821e+09***  
              
         D1.                   -401016.12                      -1199759.4***                   -1522966.4***  
ipc_tsport~l  
              
         D1.                    -27478171                       7611010.7*                       20343478***  
lnpib_capita  
              
credit_tax07   -4262164.4      -6134546.3      -116974.12      -5712275.1      -965963.39      -3169392.7     
service_qu~y    903357.34***    841939.29***    871959.08***    1034471.4***   -44876.539       1082612.8***  
              
         D1.    4190.9216***    4416.2728***    15488.249***    15027.733***    17141.097***    17769.774***  
       vieux  
              
         D1.    647.91424***    726.66414***    280.78654**     248.62148*      730.71697***    929.08373***  
popetudiante  
              
         D1.   -87.854687      -118.32938**    -62.266356      -6.4716697       34.323077         75.9422     
  population  
              
taux_chomage    3253772.7*      4673167.1***   -1688531.3***   -2416443.6***   -3001737.7***   -2898712.7***  
 ipc_essence    523354.65***    592786.08***   -192415.11**     53879.397      -117761.91      -23394.394     
ipc_tsport~l    -691241.9                      -1207366.9***                   -1403632.7***                  
lnpib_capita    -37207684***                     35758703***                     54936381***                  
        year    3358444.8      -1302917.7      -114555.73***   -2838491.4***   -189778.72***   -4412095.7***  
                                                                                                              
    Variable       reg1            reg2           reg1ar1         reg2ar1        reg1psar1       reg2psar1    
                                                                                                              
Table 5: result of the regression of expenses 
 
  
                                                                          legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001
                                                                                                              
       _cons    83.718595        562.4915        39.17786       81.526275       480.63077        22.59797     
              
        1 7                                                     (omitted)       (omitted)       (omitted)     
        1 6                                                     51.213393      -519.80322       71.392281     
        1 5                                                     399.16348       587.93184       406.47175     
        1 4                                                     232.92596       1232.1692       207.04092     
        1 3                                                     318.60837       40.341832       343.05004     
        1 2                                                    -77.594282      -956.35863*     -18.805112     
        1 1                                                     213.49855      -85.864646       229.70881     
     hhtypep  
    year2009# 
              
        1 6                                                     (omitted)                       (omitted)     
        1 5                                                    -390.43827                      -365.59133     
        1 4                                                    -273.19868                      -247.85975     
        1 3                                                    -313.14351                      -332.69717     
        1 2                                                    -247.30275                      -153.34251     
        1 1                                                    -105.93842                      -130.36069     
    typdwelp  
    year2009# 
              
       1 59                                                     (omitted)       (omitted)       (omitted)     
       1 48                                                     8.0181044      -186.61581       47.549623     
       1 47                                                     196.20961      -192.23864       267.05989     
       1 46                                                     -247.5005      -505.35168*     -249.83142     
       1 35                                                    -181.17035      -725.44581**    -222.68355     
       1 24                                                     80.861151       -140.0519       82.437269     
       1 13                                                    -86.343267       255.94674      -56.912489     
       1 12                                                      244.0084      -209.80862       244.16519     
       1 10                                                    -166.39107      -4.3401367       -111.4774     
    provincp  
    year2009# 
              
         59     440.38719***    198.90413       437.93145***    364.41447**     91.567649       388.86366**   
         48     438.46077***    272.35231       429.92645***    355.77286**     260.90141       353.93252**   
         47     203.55723*      109.39554       211.68056*      8.0844852       47.381823        1.018485     
         46     233.44919**    -61.012997       220.28042**     274.40301**     83.004984       289.54599**   
         35     357.43988***    244.03732       363.90261***    362.94755**     505.34199       417.50748**   
         24    -31.508898       -177.8003      -57.001094      -150.98073      -205.45583      -150.53443     
         13    -135.99355      -430.26966      -147.17558      -179.91627      -599.95835       -180.1585     
         12    -35.716664      -333.10705      -45.168154      -227.06934*     -357.92096       -209.8484*    
    provincp  
              
          2     475.26786**     878.78026*      510.82918**     482.15139**     975.57823*        511.399**   
          1     333.18433**     245.64328       341.06546**     342.38207**     281.38023       348.27885**   
 youth18to24  
              
          2       1832.96***    3041.2867***    1790.5258**     1769.6447***    2687.8313***    1717.9575**   
          1    -54.712484       420.03826      -61.756065      -40.953033       413.60781      -54.051892     
   seniors65  
              
          3    -481.87429**     1226.8822**    -447.42024*     -473.11746**     1319.8841**     -443.9856*    
          2    -119.71942      -112.36285       -98.85478      -100.13651      -56.957718      -86.025992     
          1    -288.25827**    -480.25803*     -301.67806**    -285.64693**    -387.94032      -302.42732**   
  child5to17  
              
          2     -371.3061       3535.1501***   -311.18496      -403.75259       3324.4677***   -354.48331     
          1    -274.25003*      282.15647      -290.55219**    -274.30946*      262.20981      -298.75101**   
   child0to4  
              
          7     737.60278***    888.60845***    716.51678***    856.84637**     843.64709**      844.3672**   
          6     830.24996***     920.4551**     842.45613***    911.88549**     1116.8256       922.21211**   
          5     387.98771**     444.88032*      376.43936**     285.14008*      19.790478       280.71409     
          4     1131.4419***    565.18055       1125.0039***    1110.1674***    415.58821       1128.6312***  
          3     641.80055***    870.87475**     651.30568***    597.82338***     764.1201       607.82823***  
          2     303.05232**     240.02789       286.95589**     445.47771**     589.73802**     410.60724**   
     hhtypep  
              
          6     493.08971*                      501.98523*      431.63213*                      428.01912*    
          5     424.04762***                    456.06892***    556.16061***                    562.48834***  
          4     113.98856                       109.55932       178.34898                       149.40288     
          3     354.88833**                     379.30566**     447.74702**                     465.96173**   
          2     394.02926**                      410.2506**     447.19652**                     405.00149*    
    typdwelp  
              
    vehleasp   -716.72374***   -1217.8009***    -544.6973***   -712.85387***   -1164.5966***   -542.97022***  
    nmvehonp   -537.61372***   -1007.0661***    -426.4491***   -539.32821***   -1022.3096***   -426.40355***  
    year2009   -134.68143**    -364.76456***   -135.57237**    -47.254798       126.27967      -60.051667     
    realk001     .0233599***    .03409897***                    .02353108***    .03556212***                  
realincomesq   -7.793e-09      -4.385e-08***   -9.781e-09      -7.282e-09      -4.262e-08***   -9.231e-09     
  realincome    .00979106***    .02125195***    .01147101***    .00959388***    .02064194***    .01124768***  
                                                                                                              
    Variable       basic       basicApartm~s    basicNok001      basicBis      basicApartm~s   basicNok001~s  
                                                                                                              
Table 6: result of the log regressions 
 
                                                                          legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001
                                                                                                              
       _cons    -.2938596      -3.9198369      -.92999378      -.10728324      -3.6103189      -.68218152     
              
        1 7                                                     (omitted)       (omitted)       (omitted)     
        1 6                                                    -.24738494      -.24150093      -.22061328     
        1 5                                                     .00239543       .15284521       .02963998     
        1 4                                                     -.2734952       .89095218      -.23170359     
        1 3                                                    -.00788095      -.20132473       .06553184     
        1 2                                                    -.32000884      -.65027078      -.28225429     
        1 1                                                    -.28829446      -.28761248      -.25456969     
     hhtypep  
    year2009# 
              
        1 6                                                     (omitted)                       (omitted)     
        1 5                                                     .35272473                       .36184448     
        1 4                                                     .34226329                       .40480252     
        1 3                                                     .26366637                       .28789541     
        1 2                                                     .03284348                       .13610181     
        1 1                                                     .36693403                       .33375053     
    typdwelp  
    year2009# 
              
       1 59                                                     (omitted)       (omitted)       (omitted)     
       1 48                                                    -.12472777       .15830274      -.06980926     
       1 47                                                     .14849649      -.06969351       .25913006     
       1 46                                                    -.32925349      -.16401923       -.3289749     
       1 35                                                    -.12993551      -.34449033      -.20805238     
       1 24                                                    -.16803205       -.0748352      -.18223856     
       1 13                                                    -.16303776       .74434466      -.08159735     
       1 12                                                     .12749118      -.42591413       .15056653     
       1 10                                                    -.16820961       .93686374      -.08459458     
    provincp  
    year2009# 
              
         59     .42842869**     .01719553       .43633988**     .34108344**     .62187986       .39337387**   
         48     .45111017***   -.00597123       .42031948**      .4210825**     .49583852       .40452594**   
         47     .15285447       -.2556538       .16590162      -.05100171       .30810816      -.06854135     
         46      .1762003      -.20826877       .14512513       .25393381       .36898332       .26571627     
         35     .26055863**    -.17795484        .2872897**     .23069087       .71815992       .34087265*    
         24    -.08689474      -.38107058       -.1442012      -.08836583       .12377002      -.09553166     
         13    -.20936551      -.55428467       -.2469442      -.22083977      -.61756196      -.26181721     
         12    -.10581705      -.74391292**    -.13966723      -.25936343      -.04564067       -.2613384     
    provincp  
              
          2      .5199844***    .82486195*      .54554993***    .53207899***    .81273631**     .55298402***  
          1     .20351174**     .06657617       .24471901**     .20757841**     .07343206       .24722261**   
 youth18to24  
              
          2     1.2443925***    .33807586       1.2463167***    1.2176308***    .53339119       1.2035356***  
          1    -.03207293      -.39033898      -.06680341      -.03090238      -.46319612      -.07404839     
   seniors65  
              
          3    -.57805702**     1.0111706      -.51187116*     -.57104338**     1.0659813      -.50840411*    
          2    -.18256947      -.32984977      -.09771947      -.17673945       .09019094      -.09450034     
          1    -.30143074**    -.49744326*     -.27864692**    -.29074793**    -.60384686**    -.27180521**   
  child5to17  
              
          2     .08876952       2.3442043***    .09137545       .05773191       2.9644775***    .03478994     
          1    -.42023037**     -.3683936      -.41294006**    -.43026265**    -.48702631      -.43122065**   
   child0to4  
              
          7     .52583568***    .80147343***    .51476377**     .36935217       .61347228**     .37562989     
          6     .48926663**     .39024751       .57922127**     .47438305*      .68560985       .56524318**   
          5     .33796616**      .4347905       .34749663**      .1774163       .20969032       .19072912     
          4     1.0175947***    1.6791994       1.0227284***     1.013337***    1.4487507        1.017924***  
          3     .73000454***    .98835681**     .72701486***    .58928208**     .97368245*      .57198619**   
          2     .24871167**     .42482641**     .26949186**     .26341049*      .61510523**     .28491032**   
     hhtypep  
              
          6     .58390404*                      .57359741*       .7843349**                     .75347221**   
          5     .40064772***                    .44724496***    .39261107**                     .41377793**   
          4     .11098986                       .16126578        .1108673                       .11318008     
          3     .23057235*                      .29065017**     .28250001                       .30770803*    
          2     .24521348                       .25637735       .41254977*                      .35111248     
    typdwelp  
              
    vehleasp    -.9204531***   -1.7770178***   -.51856505***    -.9211077***   -.93326166***   -.51988929***  
    nmvehonp   -.66731657***    -1.572676***    -.4445282***   -.66800758***   -.99861536***   -.44286414***  
    year2009   -.08511101      -.19842773**    -.10091873      -.12505505       .20268725       -.1561017     
 logrealk001    .39960641***    .61868034***                    .40047566***                                  
Elastreali~e    1.824e-07      -2.523e-07       6.088e-08       1.869e-07      -3.749e-07       6.765e-08     
logrealinc~e    .29235826**     .62462799**     .64176914***    .28165259**     .96835691**     .62276805***  
                                                                                                              
    Variable      log_reg      log_regApar~s   log_regNok001    log_regBis     log_regApar~s   log_regNok0~s  
                                                                                                              
